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Abstract 
Extramarital sexuality has always been regarded as a transgression of the accepted norms. The 
increasing criminalization of extramarital sexuality after the Reformation led to an intensification 
of the prosecution of illegitimacy by secular authorities. But in the pluriform early modern legal 
landscape a whole range of judicial, semi-judicial and extrajudicial institutions and mechanisms 
existed to exercise control over deviant behavior.  
This paper focuses on the institutional setting in which social control over illegitimacy was 
exercised in the early modern period in Holland and Germany, working with Martin Dinges' 
concept of the “uses of justice.” Both regions experienced several waves of criminalization of 
sexuality during and after the Reformation, and women were disproportionately affected by this. 
However, research for both regions has shown that women were not only ‘passive victims’ in 
this process, but also shaped the institutions, by actively making use of them. It has been 
suggested in the literature that in the early modern period Dutch women enjoyed a rather 
favorable position compared to women in neighboring countries, and that they were granted 
considerable leeway in social and legal respects. Considering the differences in the legal system 
in both countries, the question arises whether there were fundamental differences in the way that 
social control was exercised over illegitimacy in Germany and the Netherlands, and whether 
Dutch women were truly granted more leeway in a social and legal respect with regard to 
illegitimacy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Extramarital sexuality has always been regarded as a transgression of the accepted norms.1 The increasing 
criminalization of extramarital sexuality after the Reformation led to an intensification of the prosecution 
                                                             
1 The research conducted for this article was financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO).The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer, the editors of this special issue, Karl Härter, 
Manon van der Heijden and Marion Pluskota, and Sanne Muurling for their comments on earlier versions of this 
article. 
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of illegitimacy by secular authorities. But in the pluriform early modern legal landscape a whole range of 
judicial, semi-judicial and extrajudicial institutions and mechanisms existed to exercise control over 
deviant behavior: secular judicial courts, church courts, neighborhoods, notaries, and even bystanders 
possessed various legal and informal competences that were used to discipline offenders against 
illegitimacy. These instruments of conflict settlement were used not only by third parties to uphold moral 
norms in society, but also by the parties who were directly involved in attempting to get justice, including 
women.  
This article focuses on the institutional setting in which social control over illegitimacy was 
exercised in the early modern period in Holland and Germany. Scholars no longer view social control as a 
simple top-down process, but have emphasized the way it has been shaped by a process of negotiation 
between individuals, rulers and institutions of control. Pieter Spierenburg has argued that this process 
might be illuminated by considering the specific “power resources” that individuals were able to bring to 
bear on these negotiations.2 Particularly important is Martin Dinges’ concept of the “uses of justice,” 
which refers “to the many ways in which contemporary individuals have dealt with the courts” and in turn 
shaped these institutions by doing so.3 Dinges has argued that women’s access to justice was restricted. 
He assumes that women were more inclined to resolve conflicts informally or extrajudicially - using 
social control or the help of family and neighbors - than via judicial institutions. The legally subordinated 
status of women as well as their economically dependent position (or in the words of Spierenburg, their 
power resources) would have prevented them from making optimum use of formal legal procedures, 
which may well have been expensive.4 
To substantiate his argument, Dinges refers to Shoemaker who has shown in his research on petty 
criminality in London and Middlesex that women appeared less often in court as plaintiffs. Whether this 
was a result of women’s reluctance to use justice because they had less confidence in a positive outcome 
than men, possibly assuming that cases initiated by women were less likely to proceed, or whether, as 
Shoemaker put it, “women thought that they were morally above engaging in conflict and litigation” 
remains unanswered. Shoemaker also suggests the possibility that women may have been discouraged 
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from prosecuting because they were intimidated by the formal judicial procedures in a system that was 
largely a male domain.5 Shoemaker points to some important nuances to this generalization: the 
proportion of women starting a procedure increased over time, and gender differences in the use of justice 
were smaller in towns than in the countryside.6 Obviously, such “gender impediments to the uses of 
justice”7 varied through time and space, and women’s uses of justice may have varied accordingly. 
It has been suggested that in the early modern period Dutch women enjoyed a rather favorable 
position compared to women in neighboring countries, and that they were granted considerable leeway in 
social and legal respects.8 Manon van der Heijden has argued that the strong position of Dutch women 
was also evident in the way they used the various judicial options available to them, and has suggested 
that in this respect Dutch women may have differed compared to women in Germany and England.9 
During and after the Reformation, both regions experienced several waves of criminalization of sexuality, 
which disproportionately affected women. However, women were not merely passive victims in this 
process. By actively making use of the often newly constructed institutions that prosecuted moral 
offenses, women were able to shape them.10 Considering the differences in the legal system in both 
countries, the question arises whether there were fundamental differences in the way that social control 
was exercised over illegitimacy in Germany and the Netherlands, and whether Dutch women were truly 
granted more leeway in a social and legal respect with regard to illegitimacy.  
In his research on illegitimate births in the Netherlands in the 19th century, Jan Kok has shown 
that the social control exercised over illegitimacy was not only relatively effective, but also far less 
repressive in character than in some other countries.11 No explicit comparisons between Holland and the 
German territories in the early modern period have previously been made. Although both regions 
experienced increasing criminalization of extramarital sexuality, illegitimacy rates remained rather low 
and were comparable in both regions until the last quarter of the eighteenth century.12  
In this contribution, we will compare the legal treatment of illegitimacy in Germany with that in 
Holland. We aim to understand how different legal norms might have influenced the use of various forms 
of social control. The situation of unmarried women who found themselves pregnant was particularly 
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precarious. Premarital sexuality was condemned by parents, neighbors, peer groups, the church and 
secular authorities. Besides social stigmatization, many unmarried mothers faced harsh economic 
conditions. They were barred from jobs like domestic service, and wages for women were usually low. 
For large groups of unmarried mothers, it must have been difficult to maintain themselves and their 
children. What could these vulnerable women expect from the law and the various judicial and semi-
judicial institutions? Were they subject to harsh discipline, or could they use the law strategically for their 
own benefit as well?  
In order to answer these questions, we will first analyze the situation in Dutch towns, starting with 
extrajudicial and semi-judicial strategies, before moving to the civil courts and finally assessing the 
treatment of illegitimacy before the church and criminal courts. In the second part of the article, we will 
analyze the situation in Germany. The legal options of women in Germany were more restricted, as there 
was often no option to pursue a case before the civil courts. Women had to plead their cases before the 
same secular courts that prosecuted them, which also shaped their extrajudicial and semi-judicial 
strategies. This analysis will allow us to provide a complete overview of all the possible strategies women 
could employ by region, which will make it possible to draw a better comparison than dealing with the 
various institutions individually. Given the difference in the legal opportunities of women in Germany 
and the Dutch Republic, we expect to find considerable differences in the strategies they employed in 
cases of extramarital pregnancy. 
 
2.  The Uses of Justice in Dutch Towns: Extrajudicial and Semi-judicial Strategies 
In early modern Holland, extramarital sex was illicit, but was often tolerated in practice as long as the two 
partners had promised to marry one another. Problems arose when the prenuptial sexual relationship 
became public, resulted in a pregnancy, and/or when marriage vows were broken. The spectrum of 
reactions to this situation was broad, varying from responses in the judicial, semi-judicial or extrajudicial 
spheres. The role women assumed, or were assigned, could vary from victim to offender and everything 
in between.13 
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Unmarried pregnant women could choose from a variety of informal, extrajudicial and semi-
judicial procedures, either to induce the father to marry them, to get him to acknowledge paternity, or to 
be rehabilitated or financially compensated. Social control by neighbors was in the first place directed 
against the unmarried mother, who had lost her honor. Unmarried mothers mobilized neighbors, family 
members and friends to remind the father of his obligations and to restore her honor. By doing so, the 
women ensured that the father was also subjected to social control by the community as the denial of 
paternity was considered equally blameworthy. In Twente, a rural region in the east of the Dutch 
Republic, it was common practice for mothers to ask representatives to inform the father-to-be about the 
pregnancy. Such “men of honor” (goede mannen) should be reliable as witnesses and thus preferably 
unrelated to the mother. Bystanders, either these goede mannen, neighbors, family members or even 
midwives, were mobilized to bring the newborn baby to the father’s house to claim compensation. The 
rumor caused by this public action could persuade him to take responsibility. A third common strategy of 
getting justice was to name the child after its father.14 All these strategies were aimed at making his 
behavior public and thus used the social control exercised by bystanders. 
Whether these attempts at informal conflict settlement were successful remains unknown. In 
some cases, they persuaded fathers to agree to an informal arrangement with regard to his financial 
obligation or pass a paternity agreement before a notary. In others, these practices formed the first steps to 
resolving the dispute via judicial procedures. In each of these procedures midwives frequently played an 
important role. Sworn midwives were obliged to ask the unwed mother the name of the father in the midst 
of her labor. The declaration by the midwife regarding the name of the father could be important evidence 
in a possible lawsuit. This practice could serve the interests of various parties involved. It was important 
to the urban authorities to know the identity of the father in order to be able to hold him financially 
responsible for raising the child. For church courts, it was an important means of finding out the truth in 
the process of disciplining moral offenders.15 Fathers were afraid that their name would be mentioned. 
Some tried to persuade midwives not to ask a woman in labor about the father’s name of the child, or they 
tried to persuade mothers to name someone else.16 The pressure put on midwives could be severe. In 
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1705, Amsterdam midwives complained that many mothers refused to say the name of the father as it 
would disgrace distinguished people. When midwives were called at night to assist in poor and distant 
neighborhoods, they were often scolded by bystanders when they asked mothers about the father’s 
identity. In some cases, they were even threatened with drowning in the canals.17 By asking the name of 
the father in the midst of such a life-threatening event as childbirth, midwives could put an enormous 
strain on women. Some mothers retracted earlier statements about the paternity, and declarations passed 
before notaries were nullified. There were also midwives who refused to force women in such precarious 
situations. In 1796, Gouda midwife Anna van Hensbeek, for example, came into conflict with the urban 
authorities over this issue and eventually lost her job due to her persistent refusal to force women to 
divulge the father’s name.18 
The declaration by the midwife about paternity could, however, also serve the interests of the 
unwed mother. Women could ask midwives to pass a notarial act.19 Such official documents were used as 
evidence - and undoubtedly strengthened the woman’s case - in a paternity suit. But such cases did not 
always result in a legal procedure. Women used the various forums instrumentally and in most cases 
official documents were used as a warning, to threaten the opponent with a lawsuit in negotiations about 
disputes that, in the end, were settled extrajudicially.20 Depositions made before the notary were often 
used to put pressure on the adversary to accept a solution without the interference of a court and in this 
way, as Van Meeteren has shown, notaries became a common instrument of conflict settlement. Many 
conflicts ended in mutual financial arrangements established in official documents signed before a notary 
or supported by depositions from midwives.21 It is very likely that the case between the Leiden domestic 
servant Geertruijt van Thienen and medical doctor Franciscus Gomaris was settled in this way.  Van 
Thienen’s attempts to come to an informal agreement and persuade Gomarus to pay a compensation for 
the defloration and the costs of the child’s education initially failed. She subsequently passed an act 
before the notary that Gomarus refused to pay, even though he admitted to being the father of the child. 
But it was most probably the midwife’s deposition about paternity, given one month later, that finally 
resulted in a financial agreement, as a court case was prevented in the end.22 
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3. Illegitimacy and the Civil Courts 
In Holland, unmarried pregnant women could initiate a paternity suit, a civil lawsuit to demand either 
marriage to the father of the child, a payment to compensate for the loss of honor caused by the 
defloration, payment of the childbirth costs, and/or child support.23 As we will see later, this option was 
largely absent in early modern Germany. The actual number of women starting a lawsuit was quite small. 
Both in Rotterdam and in Leiden, only a small minority of all unmarried mothers filed a paternity suit. In 
Rotterdam the majority of these women claimed to have had a long-term relationship with the father of 
their child. It is however remarkable that only a minority of all women (25 percent) appealed to broken 
marriage promises.24 Apparently, the other 75 percent felt confident enough to take their case to court 
even without a marriage promise to justify their illicit premarital sexual relationship. In Leiden the 
relative share of paternity suits increased during the eighteenth century,25 which also indicates the 
growing confidence of women in the legal justice system.  
But what were their actual chances of a favorable outcome in a civil law suit? Declarations under 
oath by one of the parties involved were important evidence in paternity suits. As lawyers attached more 
credibility to the oaths of men than to those of women, men were put at an advantage.26 This explains why 
women usually withdraw their case when men were prepared to swear under oath. It also explains the 
reaction of Gijsbertje Jacobs, who dissuaded an unwed mother from starting a legal procedure as she 
would “lose anyway as he would swear the oath.” Haks believes that this reaction does not do justice to 
the legal practice, first because lawyers took declarations made by women in labor very seriously, and 
second because in Leiden only 24 percent of the men brought to court swore the oath. That so few men 
took advantage of this option, which could have strengthened their case to such a large extent, illustrates 
that Gijsbertje was too pessimistic.27  
The position of women who chose to start a paternity suit was indeed relatively strong. In Leiden 
between 1671 and 1795 only 100 of the 343 paternity suits were pursued to their conclusion. No fewer 
than 65 percent of the plaintiffs in these cases were successful.28 The debate among lawyers in the 
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Hollandse Consultatiën - a collection of sentences and legal advice compiled between 1555 and 1666 
that, in the absence of a uniform legislation, served as legal code - reveals that a distinction was made 
according to marital status and reputation. A young woman who started a suit against a married man of 
good reputation needed additional evidence on top of a declaration by a midwife. For domestic servants in 
particular it was extremely difficult to get financial compensation, let alone a marriage promise.29 The 
social position and marital status of the defendant remained decisive in legal processes in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Unmarried mothers were almost powerless against married men of 
high social standing and even had a difficult case when they litigated against social equals who were 
married. The chances were more reasonable if the man was unmarried and of higher social standing, and 
lawsuits against unmarried men of equal social standing were usually won by women.30 In many cases, 
the high socio-economic status of the father may have been what motivated the unmarried mother to take 
action. The Rotterdam evidence shows that men from the middle and higher social classes were 
overrepresented among the defendants in paternity suits.31 This reveals the aim of plaintiffs who in the 
first place wanted financial compensation. In eighteenth-century Leiden, most women demanded 
marriage alongside payment probably for strategic reasons.32 In late eighteenth-century Rotterdam, only 
one-third of the female plaintiffs demanded marriage, whereas all women asked for child support.33 In 
taking this approach, women may also have anticipated the feasibility of their case. The courts—probably 
well aware of the instability of marriages based on paternity suits - were not very inclined to force the 
defendant to marry the plaintiff, but more often sentenced men to pay financial compensation.34 Not all 
cases were pursued to the end. Lawsuits, as Van Meeteren argued, “were launched in the hope of 
accelerating the settlement of disputes, preferably without having to fight them through to the end.”35 
Civil actions on paternity were no exception. Many were discontinued when an agreement with the father 
came into view.36 
Most recently, Griet Vermeesch analysed the differences between single mothers who did take 
legal action and those who did not in Leiden during the second half of the eighteenth century. By 
combining a mixed set of sources (baptismal and marriage records, census records, paternity suits, and 
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consistory records) and record linking, Vermeesch was able to compare systematically the social profiles 
of the two different groups of single mothers. Based on this analysis, she demonstrates that the women 
who ended up taking legal action in the case of extramarital pregnancy were strongly incorporated in the 
local community. Unlike the group of women that did not pursue legal action, the women who did were 
more often members (lidmaten) of the Dutch Reformed Church, recipients of poor relief (which required 
fixed settlement and local belonging), and able to rely on their paternal family. Vermeesch hypothesized 
that women seeking legal action had been actively encouraged by overseers of the poor and the consistory 
to do so.37  
Research has revealed that unmarried mothers in the eastern region of Twente were far less 
successful than women in the cities in Holland in securing compensation via a paternity suit. According to 
Koorn, this may be explained by the relation between urban magistrates and public poor relief 
institutions. The magistrates in Holland were highly motivated to achieve a financial arrangement to 
avoid unmarried women and their children becoming a burden on public poor relief. In Twente, the bailiff 
had little to do with the local charity boards and acted from more archaic, rigid procedures. That women, 
despite the limited chances of success, nonetheless initiated legal procedures might be explained from the 
perspective of honor. All their extrajudicial attempts to be rehabilitated were highly public in nature, as 
were the paternity suits. Initiating a legal procedure was a means for them to attempt to reverse the 
accusation and to focus attention to the men who did not keep their word and broke their promise of 
marriage.38 
 
4. Prosecuting Illegitimacy: Church Courts and Criminal Courts 
Historians have shown that people selected the options for conflict settlement strategically and that their 
choice in favor of a particular institution was often motivated by the desired solution.39 Haks 
demonstrates that in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Leiden Peace Makers court 
(Vredemakers) dealt with one paternity suit per year. Most paternity suits were passed on to the civil 
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court, where fewer than three cases were filed annually. An unknown number of agreements were 
concluded extrajudicially.40  
In civil courts, unmarried mothers appeared as plaintiffs. In criminal and church courts they obviously 
played a different role—that of defendant. In contrast to Germany, church discipline in Holland was only 
exercised over the members of the congregation (lidmaten) and the church courts were a purely 
ecclesiastical institution. Prenuptial sexuality was condemned by the Reformed Church and disciplining 
fornicators occupied much of the time of the church courts from at least the late sixteenth century 
onwards. In contrast to the secular courts, the Dutch church courts could not impose criminal 
punishments. After the Further Reformation (Nadere Reformatie), the prosecution of extramarital 
sexuality was intensified and in Delft, Rotterdam and Amsterdam church courts were increasingly 
concerned with illegitimacy.41  
Discipline was enforced less severely in the case of an intended marriage. Although at the height 
of the Further Reformation even recently married couples were summoned before the church court when 
a child was born too early,42 in general bridal pregnancy was considered to be a less serious transgression 
than illegitimacy. In Amsterdam between 1578-1700 only 52 church members were punished for pre-
martial conception (meaning that the date of the birth indicated that the child was conceived before 
marriage) by being suspended from the Lord’s supper for one time. From 1674 on, pregnant brides no 
longer needed to appear before the church court, but were simply admonished by ministers at home.43 By 
contrast, in the same period 925 unwed mothers were summoned before the church court. Whereas in the 
first half of the seventeenth century most of them appeared to have been deserted by their fiancés, after 
1660 the majority had become pregnant without a marriage promise. 
Fornication and illegitimacy were considered not only sins, but also serious threats to the 
reputation of the whole church community. This influenced the disciplining process. Church courts were 
not very inclined to deal with these cases openly and sometimes even refrained from action if the 
misconduct was not widely known. Names of moral offenders were often kept secret and church courts 
usually did not report sexual misbehavior to the secular authorities.44 Publicity regarding an offense, 
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however, required immediate action. The importance of publicity also becomes clear from the role played 
by neighbors. They reported moral offenses to the church court on the grounds that overtly sexual 
misbehavior would harm the reputation of a whole street or neighborhood. Once the offense had become 
public - and this was likely to have happened in the case of pregnancy - publicity became even more 
important. Only an open confession of fault could lead to reconciliation.45 
Church discipline was aimed at reconciliation of the malefactor with the church and at upholding 
the morality of the church community. As church courts in the Netherlands could not impose criminal 
punishments, admonition and suspension were among the common sanctions to achieve this goal. Women 
were rehabilitated when a wedding was conducted. For the Reformed church, moral purity was more 
important than financial security for mother and child. Ministers did not accept that a child born from a 
relationship between an unmarried woman and a married man would remain in the home of the child’s 
father. Illegitimate children could best be boarded out. Married men who had impregnated their servants 
were suspended from the Lords’ supper until the mother of their illegitimate child had left their home. A 
master remained subject to church discipline even when there was no absolute certainty that he was the 
father and even though his wife had forgiven him. The double standard applied by the church in such 
situations is remarkable. An adulterous woman was allowed to keep her illegitimate child after she had 
openly confessed her guilt, expressed regret and restored the peace at home.46  
Even though church discipline was only exercised over church members, the Further Reformation 
probably also had an impact on the prosecution policy of the secular authorities. Van der Heijden has 
shown that fornication was punished more harshly over the course of time. Whereas initially the birth of 
an illegitimate child was often seen primarily as evidence for the existence of an extramarital sexual 
relationship, after 1650 the focus shifted, and illegitimacy more often became prosecuted as a criminal act 
in itself.47 The motivation of criminal courts, though, differed markedly from that of the Reformed 
church. As prenuptial sexuality was illicit, in theory, the instrumental use of diverse extrajudicial and 
semi-judicial procedures to obtain justice put unmarried pregnant women at risk of being prosecuted by 
criminal courts as, simply by having had sexual relations without being married, they were guilty of a 
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criminal act. It is remarkable, though, that there are no indications that secular authorities started criminal 
procedures on a large scale against women who had initiated a paternity suit.48 In seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Amsterdam, the total number of cases relating to extramarital sexuality brought before 
court was remarkably small.49 The most probable explanation is that women who had started a paternity 
suit had taken responsibility and demonstrated that they were honorable. That these women were more 
likely to have made agreements with the father about the costs of raising the child also played a role. 
Whereas church courts were driven by moral considerations, economic motives were paramount for the 
magistrates. Unwed mothers and their children who were not able to support themselves would become a 
burden to the city’s public poor relief. In criminal sentences, the inability to name the father of the child 
and the lack of an agreement about alimony were aggravating factors.50 In these cases, the father could 
not be forced to take responsibility and maintain his child. 
That secular authorities refused to be burdened with the financial responsibility also becomes 
clear from the sentences for illegitimacy; women who were found guilty were often banished from the 
city.51 Whereas church courts required pregnant servants to leave the house, criminal courts were 
prepared to close a case when a financial agreement was concluded. Courts refrained from harsh 
punishments when couples ultimately married. This might explain their reaction in the case of Jacobus 
Riettie, who had one illegitimate child, aged 10, born from the relationship with Rachel Abrahams with 
whom he had lived out of wedlock for about 8 years, and another one with Sara Abrams whom he 
eventually married. Sara received a reprimand, Jacobus had to pay a fine. 52 A woman who did not want 
to - or could not - indicate the fathers’ name received public punishment showing the community that she 
had had an illegitimate relationship and had been unable to persuade the father to save her honor.53  
In other cases, authorities reacted with less leniency. Marietje Jans van Rooijen, a woman without 
a permanent place of residence and reportedly unware about the fate of her legal spouse, was found guilty 
for living in concubinage with different men (some of whom were married), and giving birth to four 
illegitimate children. She was banned from the province for 15 years for her transgressions. Another case 
is that of Catrijn van Ingen, who was a known recidivist. She had previously been sentenced for theft and 
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was caught for begging. Moreover according to her declarations, she had lived in concubinage and had 
two illegitimate children, both of whom had died and been buried in Amsterdam. Catrijn was whipped 
and subsequently banned from the city. Similarly, Sara Bisson, domestic servant, was prosecuted for 
“domestic theft” and having an illegitimate child. 54 These examples are illustrative of a more general 
trend. Records from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Amsterdam and Rotterdam reveal that criminal 
courts were likely to prosecute illegitimacy if : 1) the offender appeared to be particularly persistent 
despite earlier reprimands and had given birth to more than one illegitimate child, had been adulterous or 
lived in concubinage for a long period, 2) if illegitimacy was combined with related offenses (such as 
prostitution) or other crimes, or 3) if the woman had tried to keep her pregnancy secret. Keeping a 
pregnancy secret was not only considered as extremely disgraceful, it gave the unwed mother the 
opportunity to opt for one of the most extreme solutions to an unwanted pregnancy: child abandonment or 
even infanticide.  
Many of the women brought before the criminal court for cases related to illegitimacy were 
highly mobile. Some of them had moved from one city to another, while others lacked a permanent place 
of residence. These women did not have a particularly strong social position; they did not belong to the 
strata of settled citizens in the urban community. For these women, access to either informal forms of 
conflict settlement or to legal institutions that provided the opportunity to settle the conflict by mutual 
agreement was probably limited.  
5. The Uses of Justice in German Territories: Plaintiff or Defendant? The Role of Women in the 
Prosecution of Illegitimacy  
 
The situation in early modern Germany was somewhat different from that in Holland. Sexual offenses 
were generally handled by lower criminal courts, which usually did not have the authority to hand out 
physical punishments (peinliche Strafen). The way these institutions were organized varied greatly 
throughout Germany.55 In eighteenth-century Frankfurt am Main, for example, the delicta carnis were 
handled by the Konsistorium: a mixed secular-ecclesiastical institution composed of seven secular 
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members of the city council and three members of the clergy.56 The marriage court (Ehegericht) in Basel 
was constructed in a similar way.57 Although such examples of a joint venture between lay and church 
authorities were not uncommon, the early modern period was in general marked by a process of 
secularization with regard to the punishment of moral crimes.58 These institutions are not to be confused 
with the church courts in the Netherlands, discussed in the previous section. In contrast to the latter, they 
were essentially secular lower criminal courts. They had the authority to impose criminal sentences (apart 
from serious punishments). In contrast to the Dutch church courts (confusingly also called consistories), 
the authority of the moral courts in Germany was not limited to members of their own congregation only, 
but affected the entire population. The following section will deal with the way that these lower courts 
were used, both by the women that initiated a paternity suit as well as by the authorities to discipline their 
subjects. 
 Regardless of the institutional differences, in many of the territories in early modern Germany the 
regulation of the subjects’ moral behavior was dealt with by the same court that also dealt with the 
settlement of paternity suits and alimony cases. Usually, the criminal prosecution preceded a paternity 
suit, or was even mandatory to start a lawsuit (at the same court) to claim alimony or compensation for 
the costs of childbirth and the loss of honor.59 In many cases it is impossible to distinguish the criminal 
procedure from the civil one. This, of course, influenced the way in which women were able to use the 
court in order to pursue their objectives. Going to court to start a paternity case meant that authorities 
would be notified about the criminal offense of extramarital sex and prosecute this accordingly. Although 
going to court was therefore risky for women, they nevertheless did make use of the courts, and could do 
so successfully as well. 
Whether or not women were allowed to start a paternity suit differed from territory to territory, 
and the rules appear to have been somewhat more restricted than those faced by women in Holland. Not 
every woman was eligible to go to court and claim marriage, compensation and/or child support from the 
child’s father. In Frankfurt, for example, women had to prove that the prenuptial intercourse only 
happened after marriage vows were exchanged. Regulations regarding marriage vows were strict. Only 
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those vows exchanged in front of the parents or, if they were deceased, in front of two men of good 
conduct, were approved.60 All other marriage vows were considered invalid and complaints based on such 
vows were rejected by the consistory. The same law, however, offered a loophole. In the event that a 
relationship without proper marriage vows resulted in a pregnancy, the Geschwächte (“weakened”) could 
make up for this by getting the consent of her parents retroactively, allowing her to start a complaint and 
demand the marriage with the father of the child after all.61 Only this action gave women the opportunity 
to receive financial compensation via legal action for the care of her illegitimate child. The accused father 
had the choice of marrying the woman or paying her expenses for childbirth and support of the child.62 
Similar regulations were found in more rural areas, such as the territory of Altmark.63 In other territories 
(most often Catholic ones) such regulations were less strict. In Bavaria, even secret marriage promises 
without parental consent could be enforced in court.64  
 But even if the exchange of marriage vows was not necessary to claim financial support, women 
would still argue that they only engaged in intercourse after the man had made the promise of marriage. 
Without providing precise numbers, several authors have claimed that the majority of the women who 
started a paternity suit declared that the men had promised them marriage.65 Such a statement could be 
crucial for a woman to have a chance of success in court. The first step in the legal procedure for the court 
was to determine the identity of the impregnator. The initial reaction of many men was to deny that they 
had engaged in any sexual intercourse with the women completely or to claim that the women had other 
partners as well.  
 If the court’s regular interrogation methods could not clarify the case, both the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s reputation became crucial. If the woman was able to prove that she had lived an honorable 
life and enjoyed a good reputation, she was allowed to swear an oath (an Unterstützungseid or 
Reinigungseid).66 This proof heavily depended on reliable witnesses. Due to the strong social control in 
early modern communities, women were able to mobilize neighbors and family members to testify on 
their behalf. In turn, if the illegitimate mother was not able to produce liable witnesses and the accused 
impregnator repeatedly denied he was the father, he could swear an oath as well and be discharged of any 
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financial responsibility.67 Many men strategically portrayed women as promiscuous in court in order to 
undermine their credibility and position in court. Authorities, however, were not always inclined to 
believe the man’s word. If they had enough reasons to distrust his testimony, they could imprison him to 
enforce a confession (Beugehaft). In the territory of Altmark the clergy suspended men from the Lord’s 
supper if they refused to acknowledge their illegitimate children.68 
 Thus, having a respectable position in society and access to social support networks was crucial 
for women, even more so than for men, since living with the consequences of an illegitimate child were 
more profound and long-lasting for women than they were for men. Women with strong social ties to the 
community were often able to settle paternity charges with the father out of court and were more likely to 
receive help from neighbors or others. Rebekka Habermas has argued that women from the lower strata of 
society, who often did not possess burgher rights or financial means and family support, were particularly 
likely to turn to authorities (i.e. the criminal court) in times of need, appealing to them as “eine Anwältin 
in Nöte” (an advocate in need).69 During the course of the eighteenth century, the position of women 
without burgher rights worsened. Fearing the financial burden that these women and their children would 
pose to the city’s social support system, the city of Frankfurt issued a decree in 1755 stating that all 
unmarried pregnant women without burgher rights were to be banned from the city.70  
Of course, this raises a question about women’s chances of actually winning a paternity suit 
before the criminal court. Numbers are scarce, but Stefan Breit has shown that in the case of Bavaria, 
close to 50 percent of paternity charges were settled during the lawsuit and no final judgment was needed. 
In those cases where this was not possible, one-third of the accused fathers were ordered to pay.71 
Generally women - and men - favored a settlement with merely a financial agreement, rather than a forced 
marriage.72 To some extent this was due to the fact that the demand for marriage was a more complicated 
legal procedure than a paternity suit.73  
The chances of success in such cases were therefore relatively high and comparable to those 
calculated for Holland.74 In early modern Bavaria, about 66 percent of the women either settled the case 
or were compensated.75 This may explain why women were willing to take the risk of reporting their 
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extramarital pregnancies to the authorities and exposing themselves to possible punishment. The fine that 
they had to pay was usually less than the financial compensation they could receive from the child’s 
father. Additionally, reporting oneself to the authorities often meant the restoration of honor for women.76 
The procedures in court often meant that the child’s father was now publicly known, something that not 
only helped women to restore their honor, it also strengthened their negotiating power and increased their 
chances of financial compensation. As we will see, for some men it was crucial to keep their misconduct 
secret. Making the father’s name public through a court procedure could therefore strengthen the 
bargaining position of women to settle the case outside the court. 
It is thus clear that in early modern Germany, too, women could and did use these disciplining 
courts to their own advantage. The very institutions that prosecuted women for their sexual conduct, were 
also used by women to improve their situations. In this sense, their strategies resembled that of women in 
Holland, even though the latter were provided with the opportunity to start separate civil law suits. 
Women in early modern Germany were not afraid to start a paternity suit in one of the lower criminal 
courts, even if this led to prosecution and possible punishment. This is underlined by the fact that many 
women reported themselves if the case was not yet known to the authorities. In more than half of the 
paternity suits in Bavaria, authorities had not yet started a criminal investigation about the extramarital 
pregnancy when the woman reported the case to the court herself in order to receive financial 
compensation by the child’s father.77 This could even happen several years after the child’s birth if the 
couple had failed to settle the case outside the court. 
The way women used the lower courts strategically is shown by the case of Maria Magdalena 
Beyer. She was already under investigation by the consistory in Frankfurt for her extramarital pregnancy 
when she appealed to the court for financial aid. She had no relatives or other people she could turn to for 
help and due to her situation, she was not able to find any employment to support herself. In short, her 
situation was quite hopeless. Maria Magdalena, however, felt confident enough to apply for aid from the 
same institution that was prosecuting her.78 Although the authorities were reluctant to provide the 
necessary assistance, as it could set a bad example to other “liederliche Dürnen” (loose women), they 
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agreed to pay her childbirth charges in fear of her possibly committing suicide, or—even worse—
infanticide.79 This case shows that women not only perceived these courts as disciplining actors, but also 
as institutions that they could turn to for help. In many cases, women appeared before these courts as both 
plaintiff and offender, and no clear distinction can be made between the two.80 
As we have seen, the same institution dealt with criminal prosecution and paternity suits. One 
could argue that women took the risk to being prosecuted because there were no other judicial 
opportunities for them to start a paternity case. However, the example of the territory of Kurmainz shows 
that even if there were separate criminal and civil courts to turn to, reporting oneself to the criminal court 
could be a strategic decision, and could even be favored over starting a civil law suit. For one, the 
inquisitory criminal procedure was faster than the ordinary civil process. The main goal of the criminal 
court was to determine who the child’s father was.81 Due to the interrogation methods of the criminal 
court, the identity of the impregnator was established more easily than in a civil law suit where women 
where the onus of proof lay with the women alone. The criminal judgment could then be used by 
women as evidence in a civil law suit, strengthening their claims for financial compensation. It 
was therefore not uncommon for women to report themselves to the authorities in order to pursue 
their goals—even before the criminal court.82 Appealing to the criminal court in these situations, 
resembles the way women in Holland were able to use the declaration by a midwife to pass a 
notarial act.  
However, it is important to mention that the courts in early modern Germany were not 
only used by women to enforce the child’s father to pay. Contrary to the Netherlands, many 
regions in early modern Germany imposed strict demands that a couple had to fulfill before they 
were granted permission to get married. People often had to prove that they earned sufficient 
income to support a family. In some cases, men had the obligation to perform military duties 
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(three to four years) in order to obtain permission to marry.83 Having an illegitimate child could 
help couples living in concubinage to obtain the permission to get married.84 
 
6. Prosecuting Illegitimacy 
The previous section made clear that women took the risk of going to court and being punished 
in order to claim financial support from the child’s father. But what did this risk actually entail? 
What type of punishment did women receive? As mentioned earlier, the prosecution of moral 
offenses was normally dealt with by the lower criminal courts which did not possess the 
authority to hand out severe corporal punishments (Peinliche Strafen).85 Both women and men 
who were sentenced for having extramarital sex were usually ordered to pay a fine. The sum of 
these fines was usually high and could put women (and men) in serious financial difficulties. The 
nominal fees usually comprised between a third and the entirety of their annual wages.86 
However, it was not uncommon for people to get remission. First of all, sentences were reduced 
if people intended to marry.87 Secondly, people could plead for leniency and reduction based on 
their own financial situation. Most often they were allowed to pay the fine in instalments, which 
often resulted in payment of only a part of the fine. In some extraordinary cases, the court even 
decided not to burden the women with a monetary fine because of their precarious financial 
situation. In the case of 26-year old Barbara Drauth, for example, the consistory in Frankfurt 
decided not to impose a fine because of the penury of her situation. She was later arrested by the 
city’s constables for sleeping in the streets and expelled from the city.88  
Although the majority of the moral offenses were dealt with by the lower criminal courts, 
in some exceptional cases they were passed on to the higher courts, which possessed the 
Peinliche Gerichtsbarkeit (i.e. the power to impose corporal punishments). An investigation of 
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the criminal court records of Frankfurt am Main show that these higher criminal courts rarely 
dealt with cases of extramarital pregnancies. In her study based on the city’s criminal court 
records, Rebekka Habermas counted 44 cases between 1680-1752: less than one case per year. 
At the same time, the consistory (one of the lower courts in Frankfurt) dealt with 52 cases of 
illegitimacy in 1746 alone (40.3 percent of all the cases dealt with by the consistory).89 If the 
higher criminal court did prosecute a case of illegitimate pregnancy, it had usually been passed 
on by the consistory because the women had been prosecuted for this offense several times 
before. These women were most commonly banished from the city, whether they were local 
women or not.90 Furthermore, illegitimacy was investigated by the criminal courts if it was 
related to cases like infanticide, child abandonment or if women gave birth in secret.  
 Although there were large territorial differences, the numbers indicate that the 
prosecution rate of illegitimate pregnancies could be relatively high. In eighteenth century Lippe, 
between 65.4 percent and 77.8 percent of the mothers of baptized extramarital children were 
sentenced.91 As mentioned above, the consistory in Frankfurt dealt with 56 cases of extramarital 
pregnancy in 1746. In the same year, Frankfurt registered only 35 baptisms of illegitimate 
children, which points towards a similar high prosecution rate.92 What needs to be studied further 
is if the use of justice by women to claim support from the father increased these prosecution 
rates.  
 
7. Extrajudicial and Semi-judicial Strategies  
Just as in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, the courts in early modern Germany were 
not the only institutions that shaped the way that contemporaries dealt with extramarital 
pregnancies. There was a close-knit web of other formal and informal institutions of social 
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control, such as the neighborhood, guilds and the institute of the Haus, all of which influenced 
the actions women could take, directly or indirectly, in cases of extramarital pregnancies.  
 Regardless of the way a woman pursued an arrangement, she needed to make sure that 
she had a strong bargaining position. The previous section showed some examples of territories 
where the prosecution rate of illegitimacy was relatively high. Not every territory, however, 
showed equally high levels of prosecution. Ulrike Gleixner has argued that in Altmark the 
majority of the women tried to reach an agreement with the child’s father out of court.93 With the 
help of family and other community members, they were able to put the father under pressure to 
pay. Threatening the alleged father with a court case often strengthened the bargaining position 
of women.94 In the course of the eighteenth century, the prosecution practices of the courts in 
Altmark shifted: men ceased to be an object of the court’s investigation efforts, while women 
continued to be investigated and disciplined for illegitimacy. This shift went hand in hand with a 
rise in paternity suits because women were no longer able to put pressure on the men to settle out 
of court.95 
 In early modern German cities, guilds played an important role in regulating and 
disciplining the moral conduct of their members.96 Guild membership was bound to proper moral 
conduct: illegitimate children were excluded and members who were prosecuted for fornication, 
adultery or other immoral behavior could lose their guild membership.97 Such emphasis on 
legitimate births by guilds was absent in early modern Holland. Historians have argued that this 
may have been a factor contributing to the relatively strong economic position of women in 
Holland, or to put it differently, the relatively weak economic position of women in early modern 
Germany.98 The emphasis on legitimacy as a prerequisite for guild membership shaped the way 
in which journeymen and masters dealt with the results of their pre- or extramarital relationships. 
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Keeping illegitimate children hidden from the authorities, including the guild authorities, was 
crucial for their livelihood. It often persuaded men to settle with the child’s mother informally 
and in secrecy. The case of Catharina Rau and Niclas Burg, fought out before the moral and 
criminal court in Frankfurt in 1703 is exemplary in this regard. In order to prevent Catharina Rau 
from disclosing him as the father of her illegitimate child to the authorities, Niclas Burg, member 
of the local fishermen’s guild, had promised her to pay half a guilder weekly for the care of the 
child and to cover her other expenses with 100 guilders. Still, Catharina revealed that Niclas was 
the father when she was interrogated by the authorities for giving birth out of wedlock. He was 
then summoned to the court, where he admitted to having sexual intercourse with Catharina but 
denied that he was the father. He stated that he had offered to pay her because he feared the 
repercussions of the guild if Catharina disclosed their affair, which gave her the opportunity to 
pressure him into an informal financial settlement. However, as the date of birth of Catharina’s 
child did not align with the time of intercourse, the authorities acquitted Burg from any financial 
responsibilities towards the illegitimate child. Nevertheless, Niclas was sanctioned for 
fornication and excluded from the guild for a year, which shows that financial and social 
consequences could be severe for men as well.99 
 Threatening the alleged father with a court case was a strategy frequently used by 
women, although they did employ other means as well. In 1739 the city council of Frankfurt am 
Main issued a decree that prohibited men and women from settling their disputes on child 
payment before a notary.100 The consistory had repeatedly complained to the city council about 
notaries settling paternity conflicts in secrecy without notifying the authorities. According to the 
consistory, these practices in many instances led to complications because women would often 
conceal the identity of the true father. And, even if the real father was named, these settlements 
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undermined the disciplining authority of the consistory and people would be able to commit 
sexual offenses without being punished for them.101 The desire to keep tight control is also 
exemplified by the regulations concerning the boarding of children, which was forbidden unless 
the consistory was notified and had given its explicit consent.102 Thus, it appears that the efforts 
of secular authorities to keep control over the disciplining of extramarital sexuality was far 
greater in early modern Germany than it was in Holland, where authorities were usually 
relatively lenient if the parents had reached a settlement outside the court. 
 Determining the identity of the true father was one of the main objectives of women, 
whether they tried to settle their case through the courts or pursued other extrajudicial or semi-
judicial strategies, as it offered them much needed leverage and negotiating power. As in the 
Netherlands, midwives played an important part in this process, and just as in Holland midwives 
were obliged to report the mother and the illegitimate child to the authorities. That not all 
midwives did so is shown by the oath they had to swear: it explicitly stated they were not 
allowed to protect unwed mothers, regardless of whether or not they were family, close 
acquaintances or had paid them to do so. But, midwives were also obliged to report the name of 
the father and to have the child baptized after birth. This means that the midwives were 
responsible for who was written down as the father of the child.103 The name that was written in 
the birth certificate was generally seen as an important piece of evidence when the identity of the 
fathers was investigated in court. Thus, the declaration of midwives could be used by women 
strategically as well.104 
 
8. Conclusion  
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In this article, we have examined the institutional setting in which social control was exercised 
over illegitimacy in early modern Holland and in Germany. The comparison between the two 
regions has revealed some remarkable differences. German authorities tried to keep strict control 
over the regulation of proper moral conduct in all respects. It would be a caricature to suggest 
that Dutch authorities were more lenient, but they do seem to have been more inclined to refrain 
from interfering if parties were able to settle their conflicts through extrajudicial arrangements. 
The cases brought before the (high) criminal courts were cases in which offenders were 
particularly persistent or when illegitimacy was combined with other offenses. The tight control 
by the German authorities is apparent in various ways. The prosecution rate of illegitimacy-
related cases in Germany was quite high, whereas in Holland only the most persistent 
offenders—recidivists, women accused of a combination of offenses—ended up before the 
criminal courts. Some German cities explicitly prohibited the settlement of disputes related to 
illegitimacy extrajudicially, without notifying the authorities or without their explicit consent. 
Apparently German authorities were not inclined to give up any of their competences in this 
respect and even restricted the ways such conflicts could be settled outside the court. Further 
research is needed on this issue. Currently we can only speculate about the reason for this 
difference, but it may have been related to the different path of state formation. In the German 
territories, state formation and confessionalization were inextricably linked and lay authorities 
took more control over religious and moral matters than they did in the Netherlands, where the 
Reformed church did not have the status of a state church. 
What may be even more remarkable, however, is that considering the differences in the 
legal systems and in the social position of single women in the respective societies, there were 
many similarities in the strategies employed by women. The position of unwed mothers was 
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precarious, and the consequences of the loss of honor and dignity could be devastating. A 
prenuptial pregnancy, however, did not make these women necessarily passive, unresisting and 
helpless victims. Women received help from family members, were able to mobilize neighbors 
and were thereby able to make use of the informal of social control on premarital sexuality and 
pregnancy that could also be directed towards the father. Women seem to have been well aware 
of the various judicial and semi-judicial routes to rehabilitation, including making the father’s 
conduct public and thus subject to social control, using the declaration by midwives to their own 
advantage, and initiating paternity suits (either through criminal or civil law procedures). 
In both regions, women’s cases were certainly not hopeless in paternity suits. Both in 
Holland and the German territories many women were able to exact compensation via a paternity 
suit. As we have seen, in German territories two-thirds of the women either settled the case or 
were compensated, in Leiden two-thirds of the paternity suits concluded were successful for 
women. It is likely that their chances depended upon their socio-economic position. What is 
clear, however, is that it was crucial for women to be incorporated within networks of social 
support such as the family and the neighborhood. Statements of support from relatives and 
neighbors were crucial for a woman’s chances of securing a favorable outcome in court. This 
concurs with the findings in criminal court records in Holland that show how female migrants 
were far more vulnerable than their local counterparts. Many of them must have lacked the 
support of social networks, and cities were not inclined to take the financial risk of providing for 
them and their illegitimate offspring. The socio-economic position of men, however, could be 
just as important. In Germany, for example, the importance of honor for guild members 
strengthened the negotiating position of women: if the man had something to lose by his illicit 
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behavior being made public, he was more likely to settle with the mother out of court and in 
secrecy.  
Although the judicial systems in Holland and the German territories showed remarkable 
differences, in both regions even the very vulnerable women - those who became pregnant while 
unmarried—were able to use instruments of social control and the legal forums strategically. 
Sometimes women chose to make their pregnancy public to defend their own interests. Women 
put opponents under pressure by threatening them with a law suit without ever actually starting 
one. In Holland, declarations by midwives or notary acts could be employed as semi-judicial 
instruments to persuade fathers to reach informal agreements. Even in the German territories, 
where they could fear strict punishments, women used the criminal law to their own advantage, 
in some instances choosing to report themselves to the authorities.  
Several historians have suggested that women were more inclined to settle conflicts 
informally or extrajudicially because of their - assumed - restricted legal status and their weak 
socio-economic position. Although more research is needed on the actual strategies of conflict 
settlement employed by women, we have shown that the disciplinary institutions that are often 
interpreted as being detrimental for women were the very same institutions that were taken up by 
women and used by them to their own advantage. When studying the uses of justice, it is 
important to realize that legal instruments could be employed in unexpected ways. This is 
exemplified by unmarried women who—finding themselves in the unfortunate position of being 
pregnant outside marriage—used the various legal and extrajudicial instruments for their own 
needs. 
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